Tag Archives: medicare

Academia, Clinical, Emergency Medical Services, Health Care, Politics, Public Health, Society

Pay-for-performance in EMS?

There has been much discussion regarding reimbursement models for health services, and two main themes have emerged, the historical fee-for-service model and a quality-driven pay-for-performance model (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Redesigning Health Insurance Performance Measures, Payments and Performance Improvements Staff, 2007). While many providers argue that the reimbursement level is currently too low to sustain operations (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Redesigning Health Insurance Performance Measures, Payments and Performance Improvements Staff, 2007), patient advocates cite an overwhelming number of medical mistakes allowing providers to benefit from poorer outcomes leading to increased needs of critical care services which lengthen hospital stays dramatically (Committee on Quality of Health Care in America & Institute of Medicine Staff, 2001; Institute of Medicine, Committee on Redesigning Health Insurance Performance Measures, Payments and Performance Improvements Staff, 2007). While considering more effective designs within our health care system, treatment efficacy, reimbursement paradigms, and patient safety could possibly be used as a foundation upon which to rebuild our health care infrastructure. The Committee on Quality of Health Care in American and the Institute of Medicine Staff (2001) offer “six aims [safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable] for improvement that can raise the quality of care to unprecedented levels” (p. 5).

Fee-for-service models, the traditional norm in health care reimbursement, seek to itemize care expenditures based on particular procedures or services rendered to the patient. Though fee-for-service models reward providers for timely, and possibly effective and efficient, delivery of care, it does little to address safe, patient-centered, and equitable considerations.

Financial barriers embodied in current payment methods can create significant obstacles to higher-quality health care. Even among health professionals motivated to provide the best care possible, the structure of payment incentives may not facilitate the actions needed to systematically improve the quality of care, and may even prevent such actions.
(Committee on Quality of Health Care in America et al., 2001, p. 181)

As a paramedic, I am bound to a Medicare reimbursement model that focuses solely on the transportation of the patient and not on the care rendered. For a patient experiencing cardiac chest pain, merely placing them on a continuous ECG monitor and providing transportation to the hospital allows my employer to be paid the same as if I initiated an intravenous line, administered oxygen, aspirin, nitroglycerin, and morphine, and performed serial diagnostic 15-lead ECG readings during the transport. In any case, though, payment is withheld if the patient is not transported. I have to assume that this inequitable reimbursement scheme is replicated across the health care spectrum.

Pay-for-performance models, however, seek to reward the provider for improving the quality of care delivered and “represents an attempt to align incentives in the payment system so that rewards are given to providers who foster the six quality aims set forth in the Quality Chasm report” (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Redesigning Health Insurance Performance Measures, Payments and Performance Improvements Staff, 2007, p. 36; Committee on Quality of Health Care in America et al., 2001). Some detractors of pay-for-performance worry that providers serving poor and ethnic communities that have typically poor health and preventative compliance will not benefit from such performance measures. The worry is that the numbers of providers will be lacking in these communities, worsening the communities health outcomes (Nafziger, 2010). Though, “pay for performance is not simply a mechanism to reward those who perform well; rather, its purpose is to encourage redesign and transformation of the health care system to ensure high-quality care for all” (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Redesigning Health Insurance Performance Measures, Payments and Performance Improvements Staff, 2007, p. 44). Pay-for-performance focuses on safety, and a search of the literature does not reveal any complicating risk to patients under a pay-for-performance system so long as the system is patient-centric, taking into account the patient population serviced by each provider.

For instance, regarding a certain type of heart attack called a “STEMI”, or ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction, it is beneficial for the paramedic ambulance to bypass the local community hospital and transport the patient to a primary coronary intervention (PCI) facility for a cardiac catheterization. In this instance, the local community hospital is losing potential revenue. Perhaps if the reimbursement model reflected this evidence-based and patient-centered decision and provided a small monetary reward to the local community hospital for allowing the directed care at the PCI center, then mortality and morbidity from STEMI in the community would be reduced and the local hospital would be rewarded for their involvement in the process even if they did not provide any direct care. This is just one instance in the realm of emergency care where pay-for-performance can help to ensure safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable delivery of care to the patient.

As both a health care provider and consumer, I would prefer the pay-for-performance model of reimbursement. As a provider, I am a patient advocate, and as a patient, I will, of course, advocate for myself. Pay-for-performance enables provider growth, evidence-based practice, better patient safety mechanisms, and an overall efficient and a more complete and holistic delivery of care.

References

Committee on Quality of Health Care in America (Author), & Institute of Medicine Staff (Author). (2001). Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the 21st century. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Institute of Medicine, Committee on Redesigning Health Insurance Performance Measures, Payments and Performance Improvements Staff (Author). (2007). Rewarding provider performance: Aligning incentives in Medicare. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Nafziger, B. (2010, May 6). Pay for performance could hurt docs who serve poor, blacks and hispanics. DOTMed News. Retrieved from http://www.dotmed.com/fr/news/story/12570/

Academia, Culture, Emergency Medical Services, Health Care, Politics, Public Health, Society

Health Care Costs, Quality, and Access

It is the general consensus that the structure and organization of the U.S. health care system is fractured and disorderly. For many health care consumers, especially those who rely on governmental health assistance, there is no motivation to seek appropriate care responsibly. Many of these consumers rely on the local hospital’s emergency department and municipal emergency services for their primary medical needs. The Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System (2006) states “[Emergency Departments] are an impressive public health success story in terms of access to care” (p. xiv), and continues to describe how the emergency departments have “become the ‘safety net of the safety net’, providing primary care services to millions of Americans who are uninsured or otherwise lack access to other community services” (p. xv). With health care comprising one sixth of the nation’s economy, doubling in the last 30 years, the focus should be to create a model of efficient and effective delivery of care so that we, as a nation, may be able to care for our sick and injured without becoming bankrupt (Kovner, Knickman, & Jonas, 2008; Mushkin et al., 1978).

As emergency medical services are considered as the health care gateway for many, allowing the emergency medical services to refer patients into appropriate pathways (e.g. primary care providers, urgent care clinics, psychiatric services) for their conditions would allow for more directed care for the patient with shorter wait times and shorter care times overall. Unfortunately, insurance providers, including Medicare and Medicaid, do not allow remuneration for such services, requiring the transportation component to trigger payment; therefore, the only option left is to transport these patients to the emergency departments. This promotes the inefficient use of such services and continues the current paradigm of inefficiency throughout the system. Though this change would increase insurance payments to emergency medical providers, increasing the initial cost of seeking health care, this would allow the provision of selecting more efficient pathways leading to more cost-effective care. Hopefully, this paradigm would result in an overall net savings.

This is only one example of modifying a current system to be more effective and help to promote efficiency throughout the health care experience. We need to consider where we can shift roles and responsibilities within the health care system in order to promote a more usable system, one that promotes integrity, efficiency, responsibility, and efficacy by both providers and consumers. Once we realize the opportunities that efficient use of current services will offer, we can realign the services to better fulfill the needs of the population where it comes to health and wellness.

References

Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System. (2006). Emergency medical services: At the crossroads. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Retrieved from http://www.nationalacademies.org/nas/

Kovner, A. R., Knickman, J. R., & Jonas, S. (Eds.). (2008). Jonas & Kovner’s health care delivery in the United States (9th ed.). New York, NY: Springer.

Mushkin, S., Smelker, M., Wyss, D., Vehorn, C. L., Wagner, D. P., Berk, A., … Louria, M. (1978, October). Cost of disease and illness in the United States in the year 2000. Public Health Reports, 93(5), 493–588. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/